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WEST YIRGINtA LAW QUARTERLY
STUDENT NOTES AND RECENT CASES
MUNICIPA CORPORATIONS-COMPULSORY REPAVING FOR AESTHET-
ic PuRPoSFEs-The question of how far the law will uphold the ac-
tion of municipal corporations when such action is directed toward
the beautification of the city has been much discussed of late. The
question has usually presented itself to the courts in the form of or-
dinances, which, framed under the police power, seek to satisfy the
aesthetic sense of the majority of the community, but which must be
sustained as protective of the welfare, health, safety and morals of
the people. So under this police power, obnoxious business uses
of property may be prohibited,' and other businesses, not obnox-
ious per se, may be prohibited with certain districts, 2 the erection
of signboards in residential blocks without the consent of a major-
ity of the owners may be prohibited,3 and in certain cases the height
of buildings may be limited.4 In this type of case, it is quite ap-
parent that the courts have regarded the various ordinances in-
volved as really protective of the health, safety and morals of the
community. In none of these decisions is there a legal recognition
of the so-called aesthetic interest of the community. These eases
then, may be said to represent one class of decisions.
The next class of cases in which this question has been dealt with
under the police power is the typical one where the aesthetic pur-
pose is secondary, but admitted to be present. It is usually held
that provisions incidentally aesthetic will not vitiate otherwise
valid restrictions,, though the effort of the courts to sustain the
ordinances under the police power seems somewhat forced.
1 Watertown v. Mayo, 109 Mass. 315 (1872) ; Manufacturing Co. v. Van Kouron.
23 N. T. Eq. 251 (1872).
2 adacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U. S. 304 (1915) ; People v. Village of Oak Park,
266 Ill. 365, 107 N. R. 636 (1915) ; Salt Lake City v. Western Foundry Works, 55
Utah 447, 187 Pac. 829 (1920).
3 Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 267 Ill. 344, 108 N. E. 340, same case
242 U. S. 526 (1917).
4 Cochran v. Preston, 108 Md. 220, 70 At]. 113 (1908). Compare State ex rcl.
Sale v. Stahlman, 81 .Va. 335, 94 S. E. 497 (1917). See also citations in Note 1, 30
W. VA. L. Q. 191.
5 St. Louis Poster Advertising Co., v. City of St. Louis, 249 U. S. 569 (1919);
In re. Wiltshire, 103 Fed. 620 (1900) ; City of Rochester v. West, 164 N. Y. 510,
58 N. U. 673 (1900) ; Gilmartin v. Standish Barnes Co., 40 R. I. 219, 100 At. 304
(1917).
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There remains the third class of cases, where the aesthetic pur-
pose is paramount and the action of the municipal corporation
aims solely at the beautification of the city. Judge Dillon has this
to say upon the question:
". .... By virtue of the police power neither the legislature
nor the municipal corporation exercising delegated power to
legislate by ordinance, can impose restrictions upon the use of
private property, which are induced solely by aesthetic consider-
ations, and which have no other relation to the safety, conven-
ience, comfort or welfare of the city and its inhabitants. The
law on this point is undergoing development and perhaps can-
not be said to be conclusively settled as to the extent of the
police power. '
Thus the courts have, broadly speaking, refused to adopt the
aesthetic consideration as arone sufficient,7 although it has been pre-
dicted that the courts might alter this position if the preponderant
settled public opinion should favor a recognition of the aesthetic
interest of society.8 The West Virginia Supreme Court spoke on
the subject about ten years ago, in the case of Fruth v. Board of
Affairs :°
"Our conclusion is, that under the present status of the law,
and considering the present conditions as to population existing
in the cities of our state, we should not go counter to the great
weight of authority and take advanced ground on the question
of the police power to regulate and control the use of private
property based on mere aesthetic grounds, and having no reas-
onable reference to the safety, health, morals and general welfare
of the people at large."
In another ease, in 1917,10 this case was approved, and a more
recent dictum seems to be the same effect. 1
A recent West Virginia case 2 has raised this question in a dif-
ferent form. Owners of property abutting on a certain street in
the city of Huntington brought suit to enjoin the repavement of
a street in a valuable business and residential district, alleging,
inter alia, that the paving already laid met the needs of the prop-
erty owners as well as the repaving proposed, and that the repav-
o D.Lox, MuN. ConP., 5th Ed., Vol. 2, Sec. 695.
City of Passaic v. Paterson Bill Posting Co., 72 X. J. L. 283, 62 Atl. 267 (1905)
Com. v. Boston Adv. Co., 188 mass. 348, 74 N. E. 601 (1905) ; People V. Murphy,
105 N. Y. 126, 88 N. E. 171 (1909) ; Haller Sign Works v. Physical Culture Train
inq School, 249 Ill. 436, 94 N. E. 920 (1911).
See Hardman, "LEGAL Lm=TAvOx OF MuNicIPAL BF Th'ICATION," 30 W. VA. L.Q. 191.
9 75 W. Va. 456, 84 S. E. 105 (1915).
19 State ex rel. Sale v. Stahiman, note 4, supra.
11 Nunley v. Mayor and City Council of Montgomery, 94 W. Va. 189, 117 s. E. 888
(1923).
12 Holswade v. City of Huntington, 124 S. E. 913 W. Va. (1924).
2
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 3 [1925], Art. 8
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ing was for the sole purpose of beautifying the city. The court,
in considering the defendant city's demurrer to the bill, held that
those allegations were not sufficient to warrant an injunction re-
straining the proper municipal authorities from proceeding with
the paving.
At first glance, it looks as if this decision were contra to the for-
mer West Virginia cases on this question of aesthetic interest."
In Fruth v. Board of Affairs, the court refused to allow a city to
be beautified by a building line ordinance under the police power,
the opinion stating that the ordinance deprived the owners of
property without due process. In the principal case, upon the al-
legations in the bill, municipal authorities have been allowed to
beautify a city by assessments levied against abutting property
owners. There would seem to be no difference in principle between
the two cases.
The case under discussion had been before the court before,",
without the allegation that the sole purpose of the repaving was
to beautify the city. Judge Meredith, who wrote the second opin-
ion says concerning this "new issue," as he terms it:
"Plaintiff's averments that the present paving answers the
needs as well as the repaving proposed and that the repaving is
but to beautify the streets and the city, can be no more than their
own opinions, opinions at variance with the views of the mem-
bers of the board of commissioners, in whom the ultimate author-
ity was vested."
But the actual decision in the case is strong argument that if the
plaintiff could prove that this ordinance was solely for the pur-
pose of beautifying the city, it would yet be valid. This leads to
the query: Has the West Virginia court taken the "advanced
ground" mentioned in the prior decisions?'r If it has, the law of
West Virginia has recognized that the interest of society in beauti-
fying the city outweighs the individual interest in opposing ex-
penditures for aesthetic considerations.
--H. L. S., Jr.
2 Notes 9 and 10, supra.
11 Holswade v. City of Huntington, 122 S. E. 449 W. Va. (1924).
j supra note 9.
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